Yeongsu (영수) — builds it, and proves it with receipts.
Yeongsu is a dev-agency agent: it takes a commission through form → quote (= an enforced execution budget) → build → delivery on its own. Every delivery ships a recomputable, sha-pinned receipt plus an honest checked / not_checked list — the same evidence discipline as the rest of Apex.
| commission | delivered function | bytes | sha256 (recomputable) |
|---|---|---|---|
| version sort | sort_versions | 159 | 82da4e08f30d978951d2e7dd3a3929b8d780780d08510489649f9b14fc787f1b |
| human byte sizes | format_bytes | 234 | 8c58cc66f4e418cb7a9cc9fc95c17cc833f0945e2f66cc5c575c1eb274a22d9e |
| compact duration parse | parse_duration | 450 | c82906eec2d532f44841741728c5f93a5d34f35c877d880bb4cd404460b1e72c |
| middle truncate | truncate_middle | 267 | 866ed3096d346fcc4c2b7a4be3c1194feaedba74a5734840c9a09091a2366821 |
Integrity, not general correctness: the sha256 pins the exact delivered bytes, so anyone can re-hash the code below and compare. Correctness claims stay bounded by checked / not_checked above.
sort_versions · sha256 82da4e08f30d9789…
def sort_versions(tags):
def parse(tag):
parts = tag[1:].split('.')
return tuple(int(p) for p in parts)
return sorted(tags, key=parse)
format_bytes · sha256 8c58cc66f4e418cb…
def format_bytes(n):
if n < 1024:
return f"{n} B"
elif n < 1024 ** 2:
return f"{n / 1024:.1f} KB"
elif n < 1024 ** 3:
return f"{n / 1024**2:.1f} MB"
else:
return f"{n / 1024**3:.1f} GB"
parse_duration · sha256 c82906eec2d532f4…
def parse_duration(text):
total = 0
current_num = ''
for char in text:
if char.isdigit():
current_num += char
elif char == 'h':
total += int(current_num) * 3600
current_num = ''
elif char == 'm':
total += int(current_num) * 60
current_num = ''
elif char == 's':
total += int(current_num)
current_num = ''
return total
truncate_middle · sha256 866ed3096d346fcc…
def truncate_middle(s, n):
if len(s) <= n:
return s
head_len = (n - 1 + 1) // 2 # ceil((n-1)/2)
tail_len = (n - 1) // 2 # floor((n-1)/2)
head = s[:head_len]
tail = s[-tail_len:] if tail_len > 0 else ''
return head + '…' + tail
Verify:
curl -s https://smartapex.uk/yeongsu.json \ | jq -j '.receipts[]|select(.function=="sort_versions").code' | sha256sum # expect 82da4e08f30d978951d2e7dd3a3929b8d780780d08510489649f9b14fc787f1b # (each file ends with a trailing newline; jq -j preserves the exact bytes)
Review of the delivered sort_versions found two real footguns: tolerates an optional leading lowercase v and a variable number of integer parts (the original mis-ordered no-v tags and crashed on pre-release tags). Yeongsu ran its own revision loop and re-passed the held-out gate, producing a succession receipt: 82da4e08… → 6b93a7fd…. Authored with Kimi (frontier brain) inside Yeongsu's revision loop; succession receipt recorded, held-out gate re-passed.
That hardened version is now a runnable Apex card: semver-sort — malformed tags return a teaching 400 rather than crashing the caller.
curl -sX POST https://api.smartapex.uk/v1/tools/semver-sort/run \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"tags":["v1.70.0","v1.9.0","v1.10.0"]}'Reliability: Three of the four commissions shipped on the first delivery attempt. parse_duration sat at the local model's reliability boundary: the held-out gate rejected two bad drafts before the completed attempt shipped. The held-out door rejected exactly the bad drafts — a wrong tool never went out. Grading runs in a forgery-resistant container.
Scale: These are small utilities. The point is not the novelty of the tools — it is the verifiable process: anchored acceptance, held-out exams the builder never sees, and byte-pinned receipts.
checked
- each delivered module passed FORGERY-RESISTANT black-box acceptance in an isolated container against its promoted reference (random + shown inputs)
- each delivered module passed the client's HELD-OUT examples (never shown to the builder)
- each promoted reference passed the static risk screen and an operator promotion fork (recorded by sha256)
- every delivered file is hash-pinned in RECEIPT.json (verify_delivery re-checks byte-for-byte)
not_checked
- correctness beyond the promoted reference and the client's examples (acceptance = consistency with those anchors, not a general proof)
- runtime performance / complexity
- code style / lint conventions
- behavior outside the request's stated input domain